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The “naturalism” of Descartes  
and the naturalism of “Cartesians”
Abstract. My deliberations seek to demonstrate that Descartes’s philosophy is program-
matically anti-naturalistic, while its being presented and interpreted as one of the possible 
forms of naturalism evinces misunderstanding of its basic principles. For this reason, 
Descartes’s “naturalism” is referred to using quotation marks. Admittedly, his philosophy 
does advance such postulations and assertions which lend themselves to interpretation in 
naturalistic categories, but only when they are abstracted from the broader entirety of the 
Cartesian philosophical system. The text provides only two such examples, though more 
could be found in the seventeenth-century though. In each case, they constituted a depar-
ture from the very foundations of that system. 
Keywords: naturalism, Cartesianism, interpretive misunderstandings
One of the controversial issues relating to Descartes’s philosophy are its associ-ations with naturalism. Although the authors of the Third and Fifth Objections 
to his Meditations on First Philosophy—who already set out from naturalistic 
positions—argued that the author of the latter erred chiefly by not having adhered 
to the naturalistic principles, there was no shortage of those who were convinced 
that the tenets were indeed embraced and implemented, at least in the most crucial 
respects. It is my belief that such a perception and presentation of said principles 
constitutes a departure from the position adopted by the philosopher. Hence “Car-
tesians” are referred to in this very manner: in quotation marks. 
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1. Who is and who is not a naturalist? 
Regrettably, neither in the past nor today has one ever succeeded in answering 
a question thus formulated in a manner which would trace a clear dividing line 
between the adherents and the opponents of naturalism. This has not been due 
solely to the fact that they differed essentially on some issues and concurred on 
others, but also owed to their fluctuations and shifts depending on place and time. 
Still, a number of issues relating to naturalism appear wholly indisputable, the first 
of which is the tradition of drawing on the notion of nature. It had already been 
invoked in the remote past when little was known about the human and the exter-
nal world around them as well, yet one felt bound to recognize more or less close 
relationships between themselves and that world, with the concomitant belief that 
were it properly treated, it would only be to our favour and benefit. Only few knew 
how to perform those cultic practices; the first to do so were the magi and witch 
doctors, then priests, and finally philosophers and scholars.1 This was how theistic 
naturalism came to be, manifesting e.g. in various forms of the cult of nature, which 
inevitably gained their celebrants and guardians. Over time, their social roles were 
taken over by those wise men who called themselves philosophers, or “lovers of 
wisdom.” They may not have called all competences of their predecessors into 
question, but they found themselves to be much more adept at elucidating both 
mysteries of nature and human needs, as well as suggest methods of succeeding 
in one’s struggle with nature, which as often as not proved less than friendly. They 
were the originators of metaphysical naturalism, which had its eminent representa-
tives already in the early centuries of philosophy.2 At the beginning of the modern 
era, there emerged a group of philosophers who effected majors revisions of the 
views of their antique antecedents, yet there was a group of such learned natural 
scientists who concluded that—to use Francis Bacon’s words—the human mind 
needs not only wings, but also such lead that will make it tread the earth and look 
attentively at what was there, as well as describe and systematize that which was 
worthy of its interest. However, that required not only the mind and the proverbial 
lead; it also called for what the cited philosopher referred to as novum organum, 
which he linked with such a scientific method that is founded on empiricism and 
culminates in such generalization that one arrives at by way of induction.3 In this 
fashion, he sowed the seed of methodological naturalism. 
1 How that process proceeded or at least (hypothetically) how it might have proceeded 
is expounded by both Mircea Eliade in his morphology of the sacred and Max Weber in his 
sociology of religion.
2 Those representatives and their solutions to problems with nature are presented for instance 
by Diogenes Laertius in his Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers.
3 Cf. F. Bacon, Novum Organum, PWN, Warszawa 1955. 
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The spectrum of disparities between those varieties of naturalism was neverthe-
less substantial. Some departed from the precursors so much that those naturalists 
who were attached to their notions found them difficult to accept. However, its 
essential cards had already been laid out “on the table,” and those who wanted 
to state anything in the matter were compelled to take them into account to some 
degree. At any rate, this was the case when its nineteenth-century admirers and 
propagators joined the party at “the table,” including Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels. Although they exchanged the notion of naturalism for materialism, they 
did not dissociate themselves wholly from the historical modalities of naturalism, 
going even so far as stating that after certain correction it may be considered the 
progenitor of their philosophies and ideologies.4 
Still, given the issue stated in the title, I will continue to employ the notion of 
naturalism, not only in view of its historical legitimacy, but also, or even most of 
all, because it is more capacious and spans—besides ontological questions (which 
had been termed metaphysical in the past)—the issues of cognition which carried 
so much weight in Descartes’s eyes. I would count the following to constitute his 
fundamental assumptions: 1. nature encompasses everything which exists in time 
and space; and 2. it comprises physical elements and functions in accordance with 
the laws of physics; and if anything happens not to belong to that physical world, 
it is at least essentially dependent on it. It may also be worthwhile to recall that 
naturalism was such a kind of philosophical monism which provided grounds to 
either negate the existence of a supernatural world, or at least to situate the former 
within the domain of knowledge and the latter in the realm of faith.5 This involved 
a particular reductionism, evinced—among other things—in the postulation to 
reduce the mental world to the physiological one, which was then further pared 
down to the physical world. Not infrequently, even more reductive stages were 
applied, while places where the thresholds were set determined the more and less 
radical strains of naturalism. 
2. The principles of Cartesian philosophy 
Descartes’s philosophy represents a singular system of deductive reasoning. Its 
principles constitute the core of the framework while everything else is their deri-
vation, be it close or more remote. The main difficulty consists not only in identi-
fying and describing such principles, but also in establishing the superordinate goal 
4 Which in their case meant the presumption of the primacy of matter over any other kind 
of beings; those who did not share their positions were called idealists. Cf. F. Engels, Ludwik 
Feuerbach i zmierzch klasycznej filozofii niemieckiej, in K. Marks, F. Engels, Dzieła wybrane, 
Vol. II, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 1949, p. 352 et seq. 
5 Cf. A.C. Danto, “Naturalism”, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Editor Stone, 2008; 
D. Papineau, “Naturalism” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007. 
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in their practical application. In Cartesian philosophy, that goal was in attaining 
knowledge. One has to add that the philosopher recognized knowledge solely in 
that which was certain and true, expressing that conviction in all his treaties. The 
principles of that philosophy were articulated explicitly in two works, namely in 
Meditations on First Philosophy and Principles of Philosophy. The latter provides 
relevant supplements to the former, as well as delivers certain revisions of the 
principles laid out previously, which presents quite an obstacle when one attempts 
to enumerate them and even—as the divergent interpretations demonstrate—gi-
ves rise to misunderstandings that have also led some interpreters to classify it as 
a version of naturalism. In my attempt at outlining Cartesian principles, I shall set 
out with the Meditations on First Philosophy. The reason for my doing so is that 
not only did they convey the tenets which the philosopher considered primary, but 
also because they established a pattern of reasoning which in his opinion could 
have resulted in the determination and description of all other principles, as well 
as enabled delineation of the boundaries beyond which the endeavour of thought 
had little to do with rationality. 
What, then, are the foremost Cartesian principles in the lights of Meditations...? 
The answer may be found in each of the six meditations. However, it would not 
suffice to enumerate them; the prime one should be identified, as all others depend 
on it logically. I am inclined to claim that the principle of principles in Cartesian 
philosophy is that of intellectual intuition. It is the same organon (instrument) of 
which Aristotle wrote in his Prior Analytics and without which not only would it 
have been impossible to accurately determine other principles, but also to aptly 
articulate that which belongs to res cogitans (mental substance), and that which 
belongs to res extensa (corporeal substance). To Descartes, that intellectual intuition 
is a faculty of the human reasons of which all people are possessed. However, ac-
cording to the philosopher the art of rational thinking and attaining knowledge does 
not consist in merely having it, but in the skill of utilizing its cognitive capacities 
in conjunction with those mental abilities which may support it in the task. The 
latter include memory and imagination, for instance. 
Does it share any traits with naturalism? Even if it does, then certainly not with 
the naturalism espoused by such critics of Descartes as Thomas Hobbes, who in 
his Third Objections to the Meditations unequivocally stated his votum separatum 
with respect to those views. It follows from the objections that the fundamental 
error on the part of the author of Meditations is that he took the primary world to 
be res cogitans as opposed to res extensa, while the price to be paid for the error 
is not only the inability to ascertain significant differences between components 
of that first world (such as dream and waking life), but also precluding oneself 
from proving that “external objects exist at all.”6 Descartes’s views also display 
6 Cf. Th. Hobbes, Third Set of Objections, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 
Vol. II, transl. by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoof, D. Murdoch, Cambridge University Press, Lon-
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little affinity with the naturalism to which Pierre Gassendi subscribed. In the light 
of the latter’s Fifth Objections Descartes not only posited an erroneous baseline 
assumption, but also wrongly attributed cognitive faculties to human intellect (e.g. 
its being “capable of conceiving infinity”). In consequence, Gassendi argues, Des-
cartes becomes entangled—among other things—in diverse contradictions, such as 
claiming at one point that “the mind is united with the whole body,” whilst asserting 
elsewhere that it resides “only [in] the brain, or only [in] one small part of it.,” i.e. 
in the pineal gland (an endocrine gland situated between cerebral hemispheres).7 
Descartes responded to Third and Fifth Objections. It follows clearly from the 
replies that those were his adversaries who could be alleged to have erred in their 
reasoning. Apparently, their essential mistake was that instead of the mind they 
set their stakes on the senses or—which amounted to much the same—they were 
adherents of naturalism, not only cognitive or methodological but also metaphys-
ical, which presumed the primacy of the corporeal with respect to the spiritual, 
including the intellectual. 
In Principles of Philosophy, Descartes attempts to answer what it means to be 
an anti-naturalist, not only in terms of acquiring the knowledge of the world and 
its cognition, but also acknowledging such rules of its functioning which render 
it rationally cognizable. In part one of the treatise, he restates the argumentation 
contained in Meditations...—albeit in a greatly abridged manner—as well as mod-
erates his requirements relating to certainty and truth.8 However, in part two—The 
Principles of Material Things—not only does he not question the existence of such 
things beyond the human mind, but also demonstrates that their existence is corrob-
orated by our perception of various sensations (“colour, smell, pain etc.); while “[t]
he mind is aware that these sensations do not come from itself alone, and that they 
cannot belong to it simply in virtue of its being a thinking thing; instead, they can 
belong to it only in virtue of its being joined to something other than itself which 
is extended and moveable - namely what we call the human body.”9 It might seem 
at first glance that a version of naturalism is embraced there, yet only at the first 
glance, as further into the disquisition Descartes strives to show and demonstrate 
that the wealth of diverse experience is not any godsend to the human in their efforts 
don – Cambridge – New York – Melbourne – Madrid – Cape Town – Singapore – Sao Paulo, 
1984, p. 121 et seq.
7 Cf. P. Gassendi, Fifth Set of Objections, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. 
I, transl. by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoof, D. Murdoch, Cambridge University Press, London – 
New York – New Rochelle – Melbourne – Sydney 1985, p. 235 et seq.
8 The mitigated pre-requisites include such a fundamental cognitive issue as clarity and 
perspicuity of the cognitive approach or of that which is subject to cognition. In a nutshell, Des-
cartes agrees that our cognition may by clear enough but insufficiently perspicuous not to mistake 
falsity for truth. Yet he agrees nonetheless “[f]or it is of the nature of a created intellect to be 
finite; and it is of the nature of a finite intellect that its scope should not extend to everything.” 
Cf. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. I, p. 205 et seq.
9 Cf. ibidem, p. 224 et seq.
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to explore the corporeal world but a major hindrance. Without the cognitive powers 
afforded by the intellect we would be doomed to numerous mistakes, or random 
truths at best; however, accident cannot be decisive for rational thought. Descartes’s 
argumentation proceeds along those lines in Part Three of The Principles, entitled 
The Visible Universe (which is seen rationally by virtue of the human intellect), and 
in Part Four, concerned with “this Earth which we inhabit [...], composed solely 
of the matter of the first element”10; still, we do not owe the knowledge that it had 
thus come into existence to the senses but to those minds which managed to rise 
above the volatile testimony of the senses. 
3. Naturalism of the seventeenth-century “Cartesians” 
In that century, there were admittedly few philosophers who professed to being 
adherents of both naturalism and Cartesianism, but they did mark their presence 
in the intellectual life at the time. In any case, they receive substantial attention 
from the modern-day experts on that period in philosophy. One of those is John 
Stevenson Spink, author of the monograph entitled French Free-Thought from 
Gassendi to Voltaire, to whom e.g. Louis de la Forge (1632 – 1666) and Gerauld 
de Cordemoy (1620 – 1684) were such “Cartesians.” Regarding the former, Spink 
observed that “[t]aking one of the articles of Descartes’s Principia philosophiae 
(Part II, Art. 36) as his starting point, he tried to show that the cause of this union is 
to be looked for on the level of the First Cause and not on the level of second causes. 
God is the only true cause; the union of soul and body is to be found in God.” As 
for G. de Cordemoy, the researcher noted that “[h]e denied the divisibility of matter 
to infinity and accepted the existence of atoms on the purely rational ground that 
matter would not be a substance if it was divisible to infinity; it would be nothing 
at all or mere space. For the rest he was as rigorously mechanistic as Descartes in 
his explanations…”11 Still, is that enough to pronounce someone a Cartesian? It 
would therefore be worthwhile to examine the views of the supposed “Cartesians” 
in greater detail. 
The first of those, de la Forge, was not only an avowed Cartesian, but also 
entertained a profound conviction that the allegations against Descartes’s philos-
ophy, formulated by the then naturalists, were a misunderstanding. Hence, in his 
Treatise on the Human Mind, undertook to elucidate and complement the philos-
ophy in a way that would demonstrate their groundlessness.12 However, even the 
10 R. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, transl. by V.R. Miller, R.P. Miller, Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, Dordrecht – Boston – London 1984, p. 181.
11 Cf. J.S. Spink, French Free-Thought from Gassendi to Voltaire, Bloomsbury Academic, 
London 2013, p. 207 et seq. 
12 Cf. L. de la Forge, Treatise on the Human Mind (1664), transl. by D.M. Clarke, Springer 
Science+Business Media, Dordrecht 1997.
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demonstration of “the agreement between Saint Augustine’s teaching concerning 
the nature of the soul and the views of Mr Descartes” announced in the preface 
may give rise to a suspicion that the author of the treatise either misconstrued the 
principles assumed and applied by the medieval theologian (such as the principle 
of utter human dependence on God), or erroneously apprehended The Principles 
of Philosophy by Descartes (one of which presumed that a human using their in-
tellect was capable of handling thinking well), or failed to fully grasp the general 
import of one and the other. An examination of de La Forge’s argument warrants 
the conclusion that the third possibility is the most likely. Augustine was obviously 
a theist, and on top of that a theist who set out from the spiritual and—which was 
no less important—the divine, only to arrive at the spiritual and divine in the end. 
Indeed, Descartes took the spiritual to be his point of departure, but it had little 
to do with divinity (with the exception of the idea harboured in the human mind, 
in which God was in all respects a perfect being) and arrives at what is actually 
not only spiritual and human, but also corporeal and extra-human; yet, unlike 
the perfect being which the human envisions as immutable, it is changeable, i.e. 
remains in motion. 
Although Art. 36 in Part Two of Descartes’s Principles... to which Spink refers 
states that is it God who is “the general cause of all the motions in the world” (whilst 
“being immutable himself”), material things—once having been set in motion—are 
subsequently subject to nothing but the laws of nature itself, “which are the second-
ary and particular causes of the various motions we see in particular bodies.”13 The 
fact that we can perceive them should be credited to our senses, but our ability to 
discern the laws and regularities within nature is due to the mind, in particular that 
part where intellect resides. De La Forge, as every naturalist affirming confidence 
in the testimony of the senses, in inclined to overestimate their credibility and at 
the same time downplays the role of the mind and even those difficulties which 
arise as one seeks to know its faculties and properties. The title of Chapter Two in 
de la Forge’s work already proclaims that “the human mind […] is easier to know 
than the body.” In the parts to follow, the author attempts to demonstrate that it is 
relatively easy to describe its component elements and their functions (actions). 
In these circumstances, it is no wonder that the issue of “knowledge in general,” 
which Descartes had analyzed so comprehensively and in such detail, is devoted 
the brief Chapter 9, ending with the following appeal: “Let us therefore not waste 
any more time in explaining the nature of knowledge, which is known much better 
from what experience teaches us about it […].” 
Gerauld de Cordemoy was a declared Cartesian as well, but the premises on 
which his philosophy rests differ from those adopted by de la Forge. They were laid 
out in Discours physique de la parole (Physical Discourse on Speech) published 
in 1668. In the foreword, the author states that what he proposes in the work is 
13 Cf. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. I, p. 240 et seq.
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“knowledge of oneself.” Without doubt, this is a preeminent question in Descartes 
as well, who struggled to resolved it throughout his Meditations... In the fourth, 
he reached a threshold which emerges between the spiritual world (res cogitans) 
and the corporeal one (res exstensa). According to the philosopher, the threshold 
can be and even should be crossed, though it is perhaps not that certain that one 
will attain the conviction of having penetrated to the other side, and even when 
such conviction has been gained, there remains considerable incertitude as to how 
far one can venture on that volatile soil of the corporeal world. Still, according to 
Cordemoy the matter is fairly straightforward: in order to know oneself, one should 
“merely distinguish between the workings of the soul and the body within oneself.” 
It is therefore necessary to assume not only the existence of some bodies, but also 
to acknowledge that “souls exist within all those bodies that resemble mine, and 
admit that it is not possible for those bodies to speak that sensibly whilst possessing 
no reason.”14 To use Cartesian language, this is the “Archimedean point” of both 
Cordemoy’s naturalism and all its varieties which put their trust in the “speech 
of the senses” as well as all that is corporeal and which— as “the movement of 
eyes or face” for instance—utters that “speech.” The problem is that already in 
the first of his Meditations—entitled Of Those Things Than May Be Called Into 
Doubt—Descartes questioned the credibility of that “speech” and then, in the suc-
ceeding ones, attempted to lay firm foundations for such a “speech” of the mind 
which is thoroughly controlled by the intellect. Cordemoy not only challenges the 
legitimacy of the Cartesian doubt in the credibility of the “bodily speech” beyond 
his point of departure, but also tries to demonstrate in further stages that there are 
situations in which it cannot wholly do without soul. As an example, Cordemoy 
cites animals which “need no soul to cry or to be moved by voices, nor even to 
imitate the sounds of human speech.”15 
In the later Six Discourses on the Distinction between the Body and the Soul, 
Cordemoy defends both the Cartesian duality of substance (that “distinction 
between the body and souls”), theistic monism, whose overriding principle is to 
combine everything that exists in God as the “first cause of motion,” as well as the 
prime cause of the soul’s effect on the body and the body’s on the soul, and theistic 
occasionalism (which makes all relationships occurring in the earthly world con-
tingent upon divine power and will). On the other hand, his vision of the order of 
the earthly world emanates a mechanistic naturalism in which the world created by 
God constitutes an immense mechanism: as “in a clock [where] the arrangement of 
14 Cf. G. de Cordemoy, Rozprawa fizykalna o mowie, Warszawa 1993, p. 27. 
15 Unlike the body speech of animals, human utterances are “ever accompanied with some 
thoughts; and that in speech there are always two things, viz. the formation of the voice, which 
cannot proceed but from the body, and the signification or the idea that is joined therewith, which 
cannot come but from the soul.” Ibidem, p. 28 et seq. 
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its parts is the cause of all its effects” with the elements indicating “days, months, 
or years, or even does things more difficult and more rare than these.”16 
The answer to the question whether Descartes would have endorsed that 
position is not and cannot be indisputable. Still, I am inclined to argue that he 
would not have subscribed to such an occasionalism in which much hinges on 
God and little on human intellectual activity thanks to which one undertakes the 
most consequential cognitive challenges and, relaying on intellect, surmount the 
most serious obstacles on the way to truth. On the other hand, it is conceivable 
that he would have to some degree accede to such a vision of the material world 
in which, using a mathematical model of thinking, on discovers an almost math-
ematical order; nonetheless, “almost” should be emphasized here, as the world of 
mathematics can be navigated with fairly substantial certainty while its problems 
can be resolved without any major quandaries. In contrast, the material world is 
replete with doubt which endures even when one has exhausted the entire range 
of cognitive measures available. Naturally, one can always resort to reductions 
and simplifications which would relieve one of the burden of nagging dilemmas. 
Obviously, Descartes did take advantage of such possibilities in his philosophy, and 
encouraged using those to all who aspired to attain the truth. This is borne out by 
e.g. the recommendations contained in Part IV of his Discourse on Method, where 
he speaks of the “foundations of metaphysics” and such hardly realizable goals as 
the “knowledge of God and human soul,” and in Part V (which discusses the “order 
of the physical questions,” including the system of planets and comets) and in Part 
VI (where the author refers to “some particular specimens” in which he employed 
that mathematical model of thinking about the world and, in his own opinion, was 
quite considerably successful in the endeavour.17 The essential difference between 
Descartes and Cordemoy on the latter issue is that the former treated such a vision 
of the world as its singular model or—as one would put it today—idealization, 
whereas to the other it was not so much a model but an accurate description of 
what was to be found in that world and how it functioned. 
Finally, it may be recalled that the eighteenth century saw philosophers who no 
longer had any doubt that Cartesian views had little in common with naturalism 
16 In the Third Discourse—On Natural and Artificial Machines—the author explicitly as-
sumes “that everyone knows the makeup and all the pieces of a clock, I will not take the time 
to explain how one wheel moves another, nor how each wheel guides the various parts of the 
machine with which it is in contact in various ways, thereby preparing them, all at the same time, 
for different purposes. We know the artifice through which all of the motions of the clock are 
regulated, and I will not digress by examining how the cord or the chain that serves to wind up 
the spring makes all the pieces follow its motion.” Cf. G. de Cordemoy, Six Discourses on the 
Distinction between the Body and the Soul and Treatises on Metaphysics, transl. by S. Nadler, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015, p. 82 et seq. 
17 The specimens in question are Dioptrics, Meteorics and Geometry (whose numerous pages 
contain diverse mathematical calculations and geometrical diagrams). 
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but showed quite an affinity with speculativism, which they called metaphysics and 
considered something of a meaningless pursuit. Such an interpretation is conveyed 
in Voltaire’s Letters on the English and in Treatise on Systems by E.B. Condillac. 
The latter questions not only Descartes’s system but also the legitimacy of devising 
that kind of deductive systems.18 In his monograph on Enlightenment rationalism, 
Panagiotis Kondylis associates that philosophical system clashes with opposition 
against deductive hypotheses and a shift towards empirical-inductive approach in 
natural sciences.19 It may also be noted that a number of philosophers of that period 
still found that Cartesian physicalism attested to having embracing mechanistic 
naturalism. One of those was Julien Offray de la Mettrie (1709–1751), author of 
e.g. the treatise entitled Man a Machine (L’homme-machine). In the work, Des-
cartes is cited as a philosopher who “was in fact often mistaken” yet who did not 
err when he asserted that “animals are pure machines.” The treatise also features 
a controversial suggestion that the Cartesian duality of soul and body was “plainly 
but a trick of skill, a ruse of style, to make theologians swallow a poison, hidden 
in the shade of an analogy which strikes everybody else and which they alone fail 
to notice,” meaning the “analogy” which states that “these proud and vain beings, 
more distinguished by their pride than by the name of men […] are at bottom only 
animals and machines which, though upright, go on all fours.”20 In my opinion, 
this essentially demonstrates the failure to comprehend not only the principles of 
Cartesian philosophy, but also the meaning of Cartesian metaphysical dualism. 
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